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Johnny Keaney and Daniel Sawyer
Faculty Advisor: N. K. Chidambaran

Abstract
The process of startup firms raising capital through equity
markets by issuing shares to the public is a strong sign of financial
growth and innovation. Going public requires the issuing firm to share
information with potential investors and requires financial institutions
to underwrite the effort, typically through a syndicate. The underwriting
syndicate is a coalition of competing banks that serve as intermediaries
between the firm and the investors. In emerging nations, this process is
compounded by the differences in the maturity of the financial markets
and the economic environment. The growth and significance of capital
markets in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) nations offer a
good laboratory to understand the formation of underwriting syndicates
and their role as intermediaries in bridging the gap between savers
and investors in asymmetric information settings. We empirically
analyze the composition of the underwriting syndicate in BRIC nations,
focusing on the size and characteristics of the underwriting syndicate
and relate them to the growth of the equity market. We examine the
role of underwriter reputation, underwriter social networks, and local/
international underwriters, as these attributes reflect the ability of
the underwriter to reduce asymmetric information. We find that
the probability that a bank is chosen to be a part of the syndicate is
positively correlated to their reputation and their ability to network,
and is greater if they are a local bank. Syndicate size is positively
related to the size of the deal, and syndicate size becomes smaller over
time. We conclude that the ability to produce information and promote
this ability to outside parties is critical, especially in emerging markets,
where information asymmetries are generally greater.
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1. Motivation and Background
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) heralds the first entry of privately
owned firms into public equity markets, whereby the private ownership
of the corporation transfers to public shareholders. A major concern in
making this transition is the ability of investors to attain information
regarding the issuing firm in order to value the shares and assess its
risk Issuers work with investment banks to gather their financial
information and present it to investors and gather feedback. These
underwriters also generally determine a price and allocation for the
sale of shares and bear risk for the sale of the IPO. Underwriter banks
thus work to bridge this information gap to serve the needs of both
parties. Underwriting can be accomplished by a sole intermediary, but
is generally accomplished by multiple firms working jointly as a group,
called the underwriting syndicate.
In this study, we examine whether the complexity of the deal, which
makes information gathering easier or more complex, and underwriter
characteristics that proxy for the ability to bridge the information gap
are important in determining who participates in the syndicate and
the overall size of the syndicate.
The formation of a syndicate is a result of multiple factors.
Underwriting syndicates are led by one or more banks, called the t,
with other syndicate members acting as co-agents to assist with the
pricing, risk-bearing, and distribution of the equity. Underwriters
generally seek to avoid the unnecessary sharing responsibility for
the deal and the profits, especially with other underwriters who are
direct competitors. Some of the reasons for inclusion in the syndicate
are: (1) the need to share capital commitment, (2) the need to share
marketing efforts, (3) the need to gain expertise and skills for IPO
valuation, (4) the need to establish business relationships in hopes
of similar reciprocal inclusion, and (5) to preserve existing links and
connections to other underwriters.1 Previous researchers have argued
that issuers gain from a larger underwriting syndicate, because it leads
to improved information acquisition. On the other hand, the size of the
syndicate could be limited by demands from prestigious underwriters
for larger allocations, competition among underwriters, and the size of
the equity issue.2 Thus, the formation of the underwriting syndicate
Demissew Diro Ejara, “Syndicate Size in Global IPO Underwriting,” International Business &
Economics Research Journal, 6, No. 3 (2007): 49
2 Shane A. Corwin and Paul Schultz, “The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing,
Information Production, and Underwriter Competition,” AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings
(2003): 2, http://ssrn.com/abstract=389723
1
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is very important and results in a great deal of competition among
underwriting firms. Our research explores the factors affecting the
size of the underwriting syndicate and how the impact of these factors
differs across the four emerging nations over the 10-year period from
2000 to 2009.
We begin with an analysis of the size of the syndicate. We find that
syndicate size has decreased from an average of 6.35 members per deal
to an average of 2.83 members per deal over the period from 2000 to
2009. Our findings are consistent with studies that have found similar
trends among underwriting syndicates in developed nations in earlier
periods.3
The next step is to examine the selection process in choosing
underwriters to be members of the underwriting syndicate.
Reputation of the underwriter and the strength of its relationships
with other underwriters are factors that influence the inclusion of an
underwriter in a syndicate. These factors also affect the role that an
underwriter plays in the syndicate, e.g., a lead role as a book-runner
of the syndicate. Previous research has shown that the factors that
increase the probability of being selected as a member of the syndicate
include underwriter reputation, participation in recent deals with the
current book runner, and proximity of the book runner to the issuer.4
In addition to extending the analysis to underwriter syndicates in
the BRIC countries, we also incorporate social network variables in
our analysis. Specifically, we use the Bonacich power measure and
betweeness to measure the centrality of the underwriter and the
extent to which it is networked in the financial markets. We find that
the reputation of the underwriter and its betweeness are important
factors that determine the probability that an underwriter is included
in the syndicate.

2. Data
We used SDC Platinum’s Global Initial Public Offerings database for
data on IPOs in the BRIC countries over the 10-year period from 2000 to
2009. We collected data on the deal date and size, the managers involved
in the deal, and the description of the manager’s role.
There are a total of 17,973 deals reported in SDC in our data period.
We removed non-IPOs, IPOs outside of BRIC and the United States,
3
4

ibid. Ejara, 54
ibid. Corwin and Schultz.
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and duplicate records. We were then left with a total of 3,476 deals,
2,662 of which were in the United States. This left us with a total of
1,814 deals in the BRIC nations—Brazil, 126 deals; Russia, 61 deals;
India, 391 deals; and China, 1,236 deals.
Each IPO is underwritten by a syndicate that consists of multiple
underwriters who play distinct roles in the underwriting process. The
possible roles are:
• Book Runner

• Co-Lead Manager

• Syndicate Member • Joint Book Runner
• Lead Manager

• Co-Manager
• Joint Lead Manager

• Global Coordinator

The book runner on any deal has primary responsibility for pricing
the shares and for a successful offering. They are always listed first in
the syndicate list. Often, there is more than one book runner, in which
case the underwriters are designated as joint book runners. Next listed
are the lead managers and managers (and co-lead managers and comanagers) of the syndicate, who are responsible for placing shares
with investors. As expected, lead managers have a more important role
and are listed before managers. A syndicate member is a bank that
participates in the placing of shares with investors. Finally, a global
coordinator manages the allocation across several countries. The
names of syndicate members and global coordinators always appear
last, reflecting their non-leadership roles. Underwriters are listed in
the order reflecting their importance in the syndicate.
We used the listing of underwriters to determine the size of the
syndicate and identify the importance of underwriters in the syndication.
To make the data usable, we had to take several further steps. We
started with a complete list of all the underwriters who participated in
deals in the BRIC countries. There are 996 distinct underwriter names
in the list, but several of the names represent subsidiaries operating
in different countries. We carefully screened the underwriter names to
identify those that belong to the same organization (e.g., Banco UBS
Warburg SA and UBS East Asia Ltd. were both considered to be UBS).
This process resulted in a total of 625 unique underwriters, and we
assigned them an Underwriter Index number ranging from 10000 to
10624 (UBS in the example cited above has the index number 10559).
The transformation from a list of names to an underwriter index allows
us to process more easily the number of underwriters in a syndicate
and analyze the data.
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For every deal, we were also careful to screen multiple entries of
the same bank as an underwriter. This happens if the bank and its
subsidiary play separate roles in the same deal, e.g., book runner
and manager. We took only the first entry of the bank into account
in generating the list of underwriter. That is, in all cases of multiple
entries by the same bank, we deleted the second and higher entries
from the list of underwriters. This ensured that our measures were
not unnaturally skewed by multiple roles of the same bank. The total
number of unique underwriters is the syndicate size for the IPO.
The steps above help us identify the set of banks and institutions
that play a role in the IPO process and participate in underwriting
syndicates in the BRIC countries.
2.1 Underwriter Reputation
Reputation of the underwriter is an important factor in the
underwriting process and can determine the size of the syndicate and its
participants. The traditional measure for determining the reputation
of underwriters is the Carter-Manaster rank, developed by Richard
Carter and Steven Manaster in 1990. Their measure bases its ranking
on the ordering within IPO tombstones.5 Our reputation measure is
similarly based on the ordering of individual underwriters, i.e., it is
based on the role that an underwriter plays, across all syndicates in
which an underwriter participates in a given country.
As noted above, the members in a syndicate are listed in their
order of importance in the deal based on the role they perform, e.g.,
the book runners are always listed first. We find that the first-listed
manager may have a different named role within each deal, but within
each deal, they always decrease in order of importance. In the IPOs in
Brazil, Russia, India, and China from 2000 to 2009, no syndicate had
more than five manager descriptions, and we therefore use a scale of 1
to 5 to rank the importance of underwriters participating in each deal.
A reputation score of 5 was assigned to the first-listed manager for that
syndicate. We then progressed down the list of managers assigning a
reputation score as follows: The next manager on the list received the
same score if the manager had the same role. If the next manager on
the list had a different role, however, they received a reputation score
of one point less than the score of the current manager. All managers,
therefore, received a reputation value ranging from one to five. Our

5

Richard Carter and Steven Manaster, “Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation,”
The Journal of Finance 45, No. 4 (1990)
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reputation measure for an underwriter is constructed based on the raw
reputation scores across all deals. We added the individual deal scores
(minimum 0, maximum 5) and divided by the number of deals that
underwriter had been involved in from 2000 to 2009. This results in an
average reputation score for the underwriter and represents how often
the underwriter secured a top position in the syndicate.
Past findings show that reputation is a critical factor in the selection
of underwriters, and so our study of this variable should help to assess
the extent to which reputation leads to choice as an underwriter in any
syndicate in BRIC financial markets.
2.2 Network Variables
It is plausible that underwriters form networks and have a tendency
to work with the same individuals across different deals. To measure
this, we used two network variables, the Bonacich power and the
betweeness variables, based on the relationships formed within each
syndicate.
2.2.1 Bonacich Power
The Bonacich power variable, created by Phillip Bonacich, is based
on the idea that “actors who have more connections are more likely
to be powerful because they can directly affect the actions of other
actors.”6 The Bonacich power variable also takes into account the
strength of the actors surrounding any given actor, as power is affected
by the connections of each of the actors. To measure this, the procedure
to determine the Bonacich Power index uses an attenuation factor that
makes an underwriter more powerful if they are connected to more and
to strong underwriters. We use the attenuation factor, i.e., Beta, of 0.5
in constructing the Bonacich power variable.
2.2.2 Betweeness
We also use a second network measure, betweeness, which is
based not on the number of connections but rather on the “extent that
the actor falls on the geodesic paths between other pairs of actors.”7
This measure denotes the dependency of other actors on any one
given actor in order to connect them to one another. As a network
measure, betweeness is important because it measures the extent to
which syndicate participants depend on a group of institutions for
6
7

Hanneman, Robert A., Introduction to social network methods, (Riverside, CA: University of
California, 2005), Ch.10
ibid., Hanneman, Ch. 10
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the formation of syndicates with others. Thus, the networks can be
dominated by a few players who have a certain level of power over other
participants, or the network can be more diffuse. Highly connected
underwriters can, for example, serve as gatekeepers between groups of
underwriters in the early stages of economic development in a country,
but the networks may be more diffuse as the country’s equity markets
evolve.
2.2.3 International and Regional
For each underwriter, we also identify the sphere of operations as
being as international (“I”) or regional (“R”). We first determine the
home country of each underwriter, which we define as the country in
which they are incorporated based on data from company websites
and BusinessWeek profiles. Underwriters are then classified as
international if their home country is not one of the BRIC countries and
are otherwise considered to be regional. No information was available
for seven banks in our sample; we classified them as regional by default.
A total of 51 banks were considered international (e.g., Goldman Sachs,
UBS, and ABN Amro), and 574 banks were considered regional.

3. Hypotheses
This study examines two aspects of underwriter syndicates in the
BRIC countries—the size of the syndicate and the probability that an
underwriter is chosen to be a member of the syndicate.
3.1 Syndicate Size
Firms planning to go public have to overcome a severe asymmetric
information problem with investors. Firms rely on the underwriting
syndicate to help bridge the gap and a critical task for underwriting
syndicates is to facilitate the gathering and production of information.
Previous studies, e.g., Corwin and Schultz and Ejara, argue that
information production is “part art and part science.”8 They view the
underwriter syndicate as a collection of agents engaged in information
production on behalf of firms going public, and examine the role of
syndicate size. Fees are shared among syndicate members, and so each
new member must contribute to the information-production process in
8

Shane A. Corwin & Paul Schultz, “The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing,
Information Production, and Underwriter Competition,” AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings (2003):
5, http://ssrn.com/abstract=389723

38

Fordham Business Student Research Journal

order to justify its place in the syndicate. The dataset of Corwin and
Schultz consists of approximately 1,700 American IPOs from 1997 to
2002. Ejara’s study examines American Depository Receipts from 1990
to 2001. Our study builds on their work by looking at syndicate size in
the BRIC countries during a more recent period.
Our study uses an approach similar to that of earlier research in
analyzing the determinants of syndicate size. We regress syndicate
size on deal characteristics, which proxy for the scope of information
production required, and reputational rank and network variables
for the underwriters, which proxy for the ability of the underwriter.
Our hypothesis is that more complex deals require a larger syndicate,
and the impact of deal size and complexity is expected to be positive.
Information production by more reputed underwriters and those that
are more networked is expected to be more efficient, and we expect
syndicate size to be negatively related to underwriter reputation and
network variables.
The expected impact of our independent variables on syndicate size
is as follows: IPO proceeds represent the size and complexity of the
deal and, as suggested by previous research, will positively impact
syndicate size.9 The network variables represent the underwriter’s
centrality and propensity to participate in networks and the effect
on syndicate size should be positively related to Bonacich power and
betweeness. The reputation variable of the underwriter measures the
quality of the underwriting syndicate and is externally observable by
issuers and other underwriters. Reputation is expected to be negatively
related to syndicate size, as more reputable underwriters require fewer
partners to bring the deal to a successful conclusion. The regional
dummy variable was predicted to have a positive impact, as these are
smaller underwriters, and syndicates may require more members if
some are regional. The home country dummy variable, on the other
hand, could have a negative impact, as these underwriters were better
able to produce information on an IPO in their country. The resulting
impact of these two dummy variables would help determine the
impact of geographical proximity and the significance of the breadth of
operations in uncertain but quickly emerging financial markets.
3.2 Syndicate Selection Process
Firms have to choose the firm that will underwrite the offering
and manage the IPO, and the selection of the syndicate members is
9

ibid. Ejara, 54
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fundamental to the underwriting process. The first step is for the
issuing firm to choose the book runners, or lead underwriters; there
is competition among the underwriters for this top position. The book
runner selects other underwriters to participate in the syndicate, with
input from the issuing firm. Underwriters best equipped at gathering
information are more essential to the syndicate and play a larger role.
Several strategic considerations, including relationships between
underwriters, affect this selection process. This study examines the
effect of factors that are expected to affect the underwriter selection
process. The factors included in the analysis are: network measures,
underwriter reputation, geographical proximity, breadth of services,
and the prior involvement of the underwriter in the given market. The
expected impact of these variables on the probability an underwriter is
selected is shown below.
Bonacich power and betweenness, the two network measures that
Factor

Direction

Prior Year’s Bonacich Power

+

Prior Year’s Betweenness

+

Prior Year’s Reputation

+

Number of Deals in Prior Year

+

Home Country Designation

+

Regional Designation

–

provide a value of centrality and relative importance in the network,
will likely both lead to a higher chance of being selected as a syndicate
member, as these underwriters are more essential to the network and
are often depended on for their connections and strength. Reputation
has been shown to be critical in the underwriting process, especially
in developed markets, and thus it is likely that this trend will hold
true in the BRIC nations, where information asymmetry is generally
greater. Past involvement, based on the underwriter’s total number of
deals in which they were involved in the prior year, should also improve
the chances of being selected, as underwriters are able to show past
success in their marketing to the issuing firm and will be more wellknown in the financial world. Home country underwriters tend to have
better connections in local markets and are also generally better able to
allocate shares, as they operate in the same nation as the issuer. Due
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to their greater knowledge of the market, these underwriters should
have an advantage in the selection process. Regional banks tend to be
smaller underwriters, as compared to international underwriters (i.e.,
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, etc.). If the breadth of experience and
reputation is important in the selection of underwriters, there should be
less chance of regional underwriters being involved in any given deal.

4. Methodology
This study uses a panel regression approach to understand the
determinants of underwriter syndicate size and the probability that an
underwriter is selected to be part of a syndicate.
4.1 Syndicate Size
Syndicate size is a discrete variable, and this study uses a discrete
count regression model for the analysis. The alternatives are Poisson
regression and a negative binomial regression.10 The mean and variance
of the dependent variable are different in our data, and we therefore use
negative binomial regressions. We also use both pooled and two-way
panel regressions in our analysis. The impact of deal and underwriter
characteristics can vary by country. Prior research has found that
syndicate size trends downward over time,11 and we find similar trends
in our data in the BRIC countries. We therefore also use year-fixed
effects in our regression. The two-way panel regression controls for
differences across countries and years. Our model is, therefore,
y = §α + βX + γZ + ε
where y is syndicate size and is the dependent variable, X represents
the independent variables, and Z represents time and nation fixed
effects.
4.2 Syndicate Selection Process
For each IPO, the dependent variable is a selection dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if the underwriter is selected to be part of the syndicate
and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable for analysis is thus a limited
10 ibid. Corwin & Schultz, 10
11 ibid. Ejara, 54
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dependent variable and, following prior research, e.g., Corwin and
Schultz, a PROBIT regression model is used to understand the factors
that determine the probability that an underwriter is selected to be part
of the syndicate. The regressions are a panel regression, controlling for
variation across nations and across time. We note that the errors could
be correlated across deals in which the same underwriter participates,
and errors are therefore clustered by the underwriter index.
The independent variables were the factors listed above, namely,
prior year’s Bonacich power, prior year’s betweenness, prior year’s
reputation, number of deals in prior year, home country dummy, and
regional dummy. For robustness, the models used the percent of the
syndicate based in home country, the percent of the syndicate that is
regional, and size of IPO proceeds, which are deal-specific variables.
The number of deals in the country in the current year, which proxies
for the level of activity in each country, was also used.
After testing the data across all four nations, the data was tested
for each country individually. The same model, variables, and controls
were used in each of these tests. For robustness, regressions were
also run for each country individually to examine whether model
characteristics varied by country.

5. Results
This section presents the results of the regressions for syndicate
size and the probability of underwriter selection as a function of
independent variables.
5.1 Syndicate Size
The results of the negative binomial regression on syndicate size
appear in Table 1. The first two columns of Table 1 present the results
when using data from all countries, with the first column presenting
results for a pooled regression and the second column presenting
results for a panel regression. Columns 3 through 6 present results for
each of the BRIC countries.
The results reported in the table support the hypothesis that IPO
proceeds, Bonacich power, betweenness, underwriter reputation,
geographic proximity, and the breadth of services influence the size
of the underwriting syndicate. Looking at the pooled and panel
regressions using the data from all countries, IPO proceeds had a
significant impact on the syndicate size and, as predicted, larger deals
increase the size of the syndicate. The impact of deal size is positive
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in the four individual countries as well. Bonacich Power significantly
increases the syndicate size in the pooled and panel regressions, but
is only significant for China when examining countries individually.
The latter is likely due to the ability of a well-connected underwriter
to bring other underwriters into the fold. The negative sign on
betweenness in Brazil is a puzzle; perhaps the prestige of being a
“gatekeeper” may allow the syndicate to be more discriminating and
thus produce information with higher efficiency. Reputation minimizes
the need for more underwriters with great significance, which may be
a testament to underwriters’ quality of information production. The
sign goes the other way in Brazil. Geographic proximity also showed
great significance in decreasing the size of the syndicate, likely because
home country underwriters would be able to produce higher quality
information to market domestically. The case of India is different; the
coefficient on the home country dummy is positive. The smaller scope of
an underwriter’s services, as proxied by the regional dummy, increases
the syndicate size. The presence of regional underwriters requires a
larger number of underwriters to participate in the syndicate.
Table 2: Study of factors affecting underwriter selection into
syndicate, using PROBIT regressions
PROBIT Model Coefficients
Panel
Past Year’s
Bonacich
Power

Pooled

Brazil

Russia

India

China

0.003

0.000

-0.016

0.061

0.019**

-0.001

(0.200)

(0.310)

(-0.670)

(1.610)

(2.720)

(-1.070)

Past Year’s
Betweenness

2.692***

3.438***

3.883***

-2.232

1.298**

0.963*

(5.460)

(5.200)

(4.940)

(-0.770)

(2.560)

(2.410)

Past Year’s
Reputation

0.149***

0.153***

0.154***

0.054

0.115***

0.121***

(22.440)

(22.810)

(4.880)

(1.480)

(7.220)

(17.570)

Past Year’s
Deals

0.024***

0.015***

-0.003

0.145*

0.050***

0.059***

(7.060)

(6.280)

(-0.370)

(1.850)

(6.230)

(23.380)

Home
Country
Dummy

0.209***

0.251***

0.589***

0.508***

0.389***

0.127***

(5.630)

(6.610)

(4.340)

(3.320)

(7.280)

(4.210)

Regional
Dummy

-0.219***

-0.255***

-0.776***

-0.493***

-0.360***

-0.168***

(-4.970)

(-5.190)

(-5.210)

(-4.480)

(-6.700)

(-4.440)

538646

538646

8296

2580

42896

484874

0.1730

0.1621

0.1882

0.1857

0.1808

0.1803

N
Pseudo R2

***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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The results shown in Table 2 confirm the importance of relationships,
reputation, experience, geographic proximity, and breadth of services.
Betweenness is positive and significant in the combined and individual
country regressions, except for Russia. Bonacich power only had a
significant effect in India. This may be due to the nature of the financial
markets in India as well as the cultural values of the nation. Regional
and home country designations had negative and positive influences,
respectively, on the probability of underwriter selection in all nations.
As predicted, firms with greater reputation and experience tended to
be more likely to be involved in any given deal. As expected, reputed
underwriters tend to be known for their ability to produce quality
information consistently and thus are invited or selected to join the
IPO process more frequently. Underwriters located in the same nation
as the issuing firm tended to have greater chances of being included in
the syndicate as their information is more relevant to the location and
they are better able to market shares locally. Regional underwriters
are smaller players with less breadth and less information; therefore,
they are not invited to join syndicates as frequently. Overall, factors
that represent an underwriter’s ability to produce information are an
important determinant for including the underwriter in the syndicate
in the BRIC nations.

6. Conclusion
The success of an IPO rests on resolving the asymmetry of
information between the firm and investors. Firms rely on the
underwriter syndicate to produce the information needed by investors
to help them develop the data they need to value the IPO. This study
examines the role of factors that relate to the need for information
production and the ability of the underwriter to produce information
in determining the size and composition of the underwriting syndicate
in developing countries.
Our results show that IPO size, underwriter reputation,
underwriting experience, geographic proximity, and social network
impact syndicate size and the probability that the underwriter
is included in the syndicate. Larger IPOs are more complex, and
syndicate size is larger, reflecting the need for more firms to manage
the deal. Social network variables, especially betweeness, are
important for both syndicate size and the probability an underwriter is
included in the deal. Firms better positioned within their network are
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more likely to build larger syndicates and be included in a syndicate.
Underwriter quality, measured by their reputation based on their roles
in prior deals, also offers an external sign that issuers can use to pick
underwriters that are better able to relieve information asymmetry and
successfully manage the IPO. We find that more reputed underwriters
are able to accomplish the underwriting process in smaller groups and
are more likely to be included in a syndicate. Past experience, often
displayed in league tables used in client presentations, also seems to
be very important and may explain why regional underwriters and
home country underwriters are taking time to build their reputation
and improve their chances of being selected into a syndicate. Local
underwriters, despite seeing some declines in percentage terms, seem
to be participating in syndicates more often, perhaps due to their
knowledge of home markets. Underwriters in the same country as
the IPO issuer are more selective in choosing with whom they work,
perhaps because there is knowledge and technology transfer from larger
players to emerging market underwriters. Many underwriters are
regional and smaller in size, but regional underwriters are becoming
more important in their respective networks.
There are important similarities and differences in the impact
of the variables between countries when we run individual country
regressions. Large IPOs require larger syndicates across all countries.
The impact of underwriter reputation and social network variables,
however, is largely present only in China and Brazil, and syndicate
size in Russia and India do not depend on the social network variables.
While the determinants of syndicate size and probability of inclusion
in a syndicate are largely similar across all the BRIC countries, some
significant differences remain. The probability of an underwriter being
included in a deal is similar across all Brazil, India, and China, and the
social network variables are important in all BRIC countries except
Russia.
Overall, this research shows that factors that are important in the
size and composition of underwriter syndicates for IPOs in the BRIC
countries reflect the importance of information production. To be
selected and included in a syndicate, underwriters must find ways to
prove their ability to produce information not only to the issuers and
investors, but also to other underwriters. The internal and external
signs of strength as an underwriter lead to greater success in the
future, along with greater fees and overall earnings. Firms in these
nations should strive to promote their ability to relieve information
asymmetry and form strong connections and reputations. As this
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continues to happen, our prediction is that local players will continue
to consolidate, become more able to bear risk, and gain greater
influence in the markets. International players will continue to have
great influence and likely move toward less-developed markets to
seek greater profits. Future research projects will focus on examining
changes in underwriter network structure over time and how firms
develop strength in these markets.
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